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RETROSPECTIVE REMOVAL OF 
GAMETE DONOR ANONYMITY: POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ONTARIO 
BASED ON THE VICTORIAN 
EXPERIENCE 
Alicia Czarnowski* 
This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of the 
gamete-donor anonymity schemes in Ontario, Canada and 
Victoria, Australia. As of March 1, 2017, Victoria became 
the first jurisdiction in the world to retrospectively remove 
gamete-donor anonymity. Conversely, donor anonymity 
remains protected in Ontario, largely through statutory 
silence. While many donor conceived individuals are 
calling for other jurisdictions to follow suit and 
retrospectively abolish anonymity, an in-depth analysis of 
Victoria’s policy-making process suggests that Ontario 
should not take a similar course of action. This conclusion 
is based on the inherent issues with retrospective 
legislation, the historical differences between the two 
jurisdictions in overseeing gamete donation, the Victorian 
government’s inconsistent reliance on evidence, and the ill-
suited reasoning used to justify Victoria’s policy decision. 
In lieu of enacting retrospective legislation, this paper 
recommends that Ontario should increase public education 
and create a voluntary, provincial donor registry. Based on 
a relational approach, these steps are more conducive to 
 
*  Doctoral candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. The author 
would like to thank the anonymous peer reviewers and the journal 
editors for their helpful comments.  
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harmonizing the complex, interconnected interests at play 
and to supporting healthy relationships in whatever form 
they may take.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As of March 1, 2017, the state of Victoria in Australia was 
the first in the world to retrospectively remove gamete 
donor anonymity.1 This means that individuals who 
donated their sperm or eggs under a promise of anonymity 
may now have their identifying information released to 
offspring born from their gametes, without their consent. 
Many donor conceived individuals (DCIs) are arguing that 
donor anonymity should be similarly abolished in Canada.2 
However, since donor anonymity falls under provincial 
jurisdiction,3 each province may permit or prohibit 
different activities. As a result, the subject matter is best 
understood from a provincial perspective, as opposed to a 
federal one. This paper focuses on Canada’s most 
 
1  See Assisted Reproductive Treatment Amendment Act 2016 (Vic), 
2016/6. 
2  See e.g. Fiona Kelly, “Is it Time to Tell? Abolishing Donor Anonymity 
in Canada” (2017) 30:2 Can J Fam L 173. See also Rebecca Johns, 
“Abolishing Anonymity: A Rights-Based Approach to Evaluating 
Anonymous Sperm Donation” (2013) 20:2 UCLA Women’s LJ 111 
(generally argues that sperm donor anonymity ought to be abolished, 
as the harms done to DCIs outweigh any interests that the donors or 
intended parents may have in anonymity); Oliver Hallich, “Sperm 
Donation and the Right to Privacy” (2017) 23:2 New Bioethics 107 
(generally argues that sperm donation identity should be known from 
the time of conception).  
3  See Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61 at 
para 280 (Lebel and Deschamp JJ, concluding on behalf of four justices 
that, along with other provisions, the information-gathering and 
privacy-related provisions at ss. 14–18 of the Act lay outside federal 
jurisdiction) and para 294 (Cromwell J, agreeing that the information-
gathering and privacy-related provisions exceeded the “legislative 
authority of the Parliament of Canada”) [Re AHRA]. 
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populated province—Ontario.4 A comparative framework 
is used to analyze Victoria’s retrospective donor-
anonymity policy in juxtaposition to the current donor-
anonymity scheme in Ontario. Based on an in-depth 
examination of Victoria’s legislative history, this paper 
argues that a similar course of action should not be 
followed in Ontario, despite the abundant problems that 
exist within the province’s current set-up. 
  Before arriving at this conclusion, this paper will 
first lay out the legal landscape in both jurisdictions. 
Currently, in Ontario, donors can choose to be known or to 
remain anonymous. They can also choose to release their 
identity once the DCI reaches a specific age.5 Since donors 
have the option to retain their privacy, DCIs often have 
very little information available to them.6 Record-keeping 
of non-identifying information is inconsistent and 
piecemeal.7 With respect to identifying information, DCIs 
are relegated to using unofficial, voluntary (and therefore 
incomplete) registries, or attempting to find their 
anonymous donors using mail-order DNA kits and 
 
4  See “Population Estimates, Quarterly”, online: Statistics Canada 
<www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710000901>. 
5  Vanessa Gruben & Angela Cameron, “Donor Anonymity in Canada: 
Assessing the Obstacles to Openness and Considering a Way Forward” 
(2017) 54:3 Alta L Rev 665 at 668. 
6  Vanessa Gruben, “A Number but No Name: Is There a Constitutional 
Right to Know One’s Sperm Donor in Canadian Law?” in Trudo 
Lemmens et al, eds, Regulating Creation: The Law, Ethics and Policy 
of Assisted Human Reproduction (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2017) 145 at 147–148. 
7  Ibid. 
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genealogy websites.8 The inability to track down donor 
information can potentially lead to both physical and 
mental health issues,9 making Ontario’s current system 
quite problematic. 
Conversely, DCIs in Victoria are able to apply to a 
Central Register in order to receive identifying 
information, regardless of when they were conceived or 
whether their donor was assured anonymity at the time of 
donation. Donors have no ability to refuse the sharing of 
their identifying information. However, donors may submit 
a contact preference stating their preferred method of 
contact. This can include choosing a no contact option that 
is legally enforceable.10  
In order to determine whether Ontario should take 
a similar course of action, this paper will briefly summarize 
the traditional problems associated with retrospective 
 
8  See Emily Chung, Melanie Glanz & Vik Adhopia, “Donor-Conceived 
People Are Tracking Down Their Biological Fathers, Even If They 
Want to Hide”, CBC (25 January 2018), online: 
<www.cbc.ca/news/technology/sperm-donor-dna-testing-
1.4500517>; Elizabeth Payne, “Has the Age of the Anonymous Sperm 




9  See Pratten v British Colombia (Attorney General), 2011 BCSC 656 
at para 111 [Pratten]. 
10  See Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic), 2008/76, ss 63C–
63G; Austl, Victoria, Victorian Assisted Reproductive Treatment 
Authority, The History of Donor Conception Records in Victoria by 
Fiona Kelly & Deborah Dempsey (Melbourne: VARTA, 2018) at 8–9 
[History of Donor Conception Records in Victoria]. 
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legislation (for example, unfairness and lack of notice),11 
as well as the historical differences between the two 
jurisdictions with respect to their oversight of gamete 
donation, before launching into an in-depth analysis of 
Victoria’s policy decision. In sum, Victoria’s decision to 
retrospectively remove donor anonymity should not be 
followed because Victoria’s policy change was a 
politicized move, as opposed to an evidence-based 
decision. The inquiries conducted by the Victorian 
government collectively led to the conclusion that 
information should only be released with the donors’ 
consent.12 The non-consensual, retrospective removal of 
anonymity only occurred as part of a newly elected 
government’s fulfillment of its election promises.13 
Moreover, the state’s reasoning behind its policy change 
was ill-suited to the subject matter. Victoria adopted a 
harm-based approach, which involved pinning the harms 
affecting DCIs against the potential fears of donors. By 
contrast, this paper adopts Michelle Taylor-Sands’s 
argument that the matter should be approached from a 
relational perspective.14 Relational theory acknowledges 
the interwoven nature of the interests at stake and is more 
likely to foster healthy relationships, which the state cannot 
compel. 
 
11  See e.g. Gruben, supra note 6 at 161. 
12  Austl, Victoria, Inquiry into Access by Donor-Conceived People to 
Information about Donors: Victorian Government Response 
(Melbourne, 2013) at 5 [Victorian Government Response]. 
13  Michelle Taylor-Sands, “Removing Donor Anonymity: What Does It 
Achieve? Revisiting the Welfare of Donor-Conceived Individuals” 
(2018) 41:2 UNSWLJ 555 at 560–561. 
14  Ibid. 
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The privacy breaches in Victoria are therefore 
unjustified. However, the current status quo in Ontario is 
also unarguably problematic. To ameliorate Ontario’s 
situation, this paper will conclude by making two policy 
recommendations. First, Ontario should increase public 
awareness and education regarding the importance of 
information disclosure, in the hopes that donors will come 
forward voluntarily. Even if donors are unwilling to submit 
identifying information, they may still be willing to share 
newly acquired medical information once they are made 
aware of how crucial this data can be. Second, an official, 
voluntary, donor registry should be created and maintained 
by the province, so that DCIs have one specific forum 
through which they can obtain non-identifying information 
about their donors. This registry could also oversee the 
dissemination of voluntarily provided identifying 
information and help facilitate contact between DCIs and 
donors, where such contact is mutually desired. In 
accordance with relational theory, these steps best 
harmonize the complex interests of the parties at hand. 
DONOR ANONYMITY IN ONTARIO 
Canada’s history with respect to regulating assisted 
reproduction has been tumultuous. In 1989, the federal 
government ventured into the territory by assembling the 
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies 
(the Commission) to study the social, legal, and ethical 
implications of assisted reproduction. Along with 
providing assurances that the federal government had 
jurisdiction to legislate in the area, the Commission 
recommended that non-identifying information (i.e., 
general information that could not reasonably be used to 
identify an exact person—for example, blood type, birth 
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year, height, or eye colour) should be disclosed to DCIs, 
but identifying information (i.e., data that can be used to 
pinpoint a specific individual—for example, a name, a 
birth date, an address, or a social insurance number) should 
be stored but not disclosed, barring “extraordinary 
circumstances of medical need under strictly controlled 
conditions.”15 In arriving at this conclusion, the 
Commission focused on protecting the choices of intended 
parents, the presumed negative effect of disclosure on 
gamete supply, and the ambiguous legal status of known 
donors at the time.16 
The Commission’s report was released, but no 
legislation was immediately enacted. Instead, it took the 
federal government several attempted bills over the course 
of more than a decade before the Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act (AHRA) was successfully passed. As part 
of their further evidence-gathering efforts, in 2001 the 
House of Commons assembled a Standing Committee on 
Health (the Committee), which recommended the exact 
opposite of the Commission. It suggested that, in order to 
be eligible to donate, gamete donors should be required to 
 
15  Canada, Proceed with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on 
New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: RCNRT, 1993) at 445. This 
quote comes from the Commission’s discussion of sperm donor 
anonymity, but the same anonymity protection was put forward for egg 
donors on page 1029 of the Report. 
16  See Angela Cameron, Vanessa Gruben & Fiona Kelly, “De-
Anonymising Sperm Donors in Canada: Some Doubts and Directions” 
(2010) 26:1 Can J Fam L 95 at 100–101. At the time the Report was 
released, it was unclear whether known donors might incur parental 
rights and responsibilities under family law legislation, such as custody 
or support.  
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consent to the disclosure of their identifying information.17 
The Committee believed that, where donor rights and DCI 
rights conflicted, the well-being of DCIs ought to be 
paramount.18 
Ultimately, the Committee’s advice was not 
heeded. Adhering to the Commission’s original suggestion, 
the AHRA permitted anonymous gamete donation. The Act 
created a scheme whereby identifying information about a 
donor could not be disclosed to gamete recipients or DCIs 
without the donor’s consent.19 However, non-identifying 
information could be shared.20 Furthermore, the AHRA 
contemplated the creation of an administrative body, called 
Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada 
(AHRC), which would maintain all identifying and non-
identifying information, oversee the disclosure of non-
identifying information, and process applications from 
DCIs who wanted to ensure they were not biologically 
related to potential partners.21  
Unfortunately, the federal efforts for nation-wide 
oversight were derailed. Two years after the AHRA was 
passed, the Attorney General of Quebec commenced a 
reference regarding the constitutionality of multiple 
sections of the AHRA, including the provisions surrounding 
 
17  See House of Commons, Standing Committee on Health, Assisted 
Human Reproduction: Building Families (December 2001) (Chair: 
Bonnie Brown) at 21–22 (recommendation 19(a)). 
18  See ibid at 1, 21. 
19  See Assisted Human Reproduction Act, SC 2004, c 2, s 18(3) [AHRA]. 
20  See ibid.  
21  See ibid, ss 17, 18. 
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donor anonymity.22 Under the Constitution Act, 1867,23 the 
federal government has jurisdiction over criminal law,24 
whereas the provinces maintain jurisdiction over health 
services.25 Quebec argued that that the governance of 
reproductive technologies properly fell within the scope of 
the latter, and as such, the federally-enacted AHRA violated 
the constitutional division of powers.26 In a 4–4–1 split, the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that several sections of the 
AHRA, including the sections pertaining to donor 
anonymity, were primarily aimed at regulating a health 
service. As a result, the provisions were deemed ultra vires 
and were subsequently repealed. The AHRC, having had 
most of its mandate gutted, was also shut down a few years 
later.27 
Consequently, the law became silent on the issue of 
donor anonymity. In the absence of any explicit caveats, 
gamete donor information is not distinguished from patient 
information acquired in any other medical context. This 
 
22  Renvoi relatif à la Loi sur la procréation assistée, 2008 QCCA 1167 
[Renvoi à la Loi sur la procreation assistée]. 
23  Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, 
Appendix II, No 5. 
24  Ibid, s 91(27). 
25  Ibid, ss 92(7), 92(13), 92(16). 
26  See Renvoi à la Loi sur la procreation assistée, supra note 22 at paras 
26–27. See also “Bill C-47, An Act respecting human reproductive 
technologies and commercial transactions relating to human 
reproduction”, 2nd reading, House of Commons Debates, 35-2, No 89 
(23 October 1996) at 5623 (Hon Pauline Picard).  
27  See Françoise Baylis & Jocelyn Downie, “The Tale of Assisted Human 
Reproduction in Canada: A Tragedy in Five Acts” (2013) 25:2 CJWL 
183 at 201. 
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means that, in practice, Ontarian gamete donors have three 
main options concerning the disclosure of their identifying 
information. First, they can donate their gametes 
anonymously. If they do, their health practitioners are 
bound to keep their identifying information private due to 
contractual provisions and general provincial health 
privacy laws, which prohibit sharing identifying health 
information without patient consent.28 However, non-
identifying information about the donor may still be 
disclosed. Second, donors can opt for identity-release 
donation, wherein they consent to the release of their 
identity once a DCI reaches a specific age (usually 
eighteen).29 There are no Canadian statutes in place 
governing this kind of disclosure. Rather, the identity-
release scheme is contractually established. Finally, the 
donor can be known—in other words, his or her identifying 
information would be released from the very beginning of 
the gamete donation process.  
Following the reference decision, Ontario has not 
stepped in to regulate anonymous gamete donation. No 
provincial registry has been created to oversee the 
collection or disclosure of donor information. Nor have any 
specialized regulations been put into place to mandate what 
information medical practitioners must gather and store 
when collecting gametes. Nevertheless, gamete donation is 
continuing to occur. While several sperm banks exist 
 
28  See e.g. Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004, SO 2004, 
c 3, Schedule A. 
29  See Gruben & Cameron, supra note 5 at 668. 
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within Ontario,30 sperm is mostly imported from other 
countries, like the US.31 This is important to note when 
considering legal reform. Navigating multiple legal 
regimes creates an additional layer of complexity and could 
potentially affect the availability of gametes.32 
Many advocates and DCIs have testified to the 
harms that may result from anonymous gamete donation 
occurring in an unregulated space.33 As one example, DCIs 
with anonymous donors often have no knowledge of their 
family medical history. This lack of information can delay 
proper diagnoses.34 Furthermore, awareness of family 
history may prompt individuals to test for heritable 
conditions,35 such as genetic markers associated with 
Huntington’s disease or breast cancer linked with the 
 
30  See e.g. “ReproMed - Sperm Bank”, online: ReproMed 
<www.repromed.ca/sperm_bank>; “Why CanAm?”, online: Can-Am 
Cryoservices <www.canamcryo.com/en/why-canam>. 
31  See Kristy Woudsta, “Sperm Donor Canada: Banks Are Almost Empty 
of Homegrown Supply” (8 March 2016), online: Huffington Post 
<www.huffingtonpost.ca/2016/03/07/sperm-donor-
canada_n_8638488.html>; Daria O’Reilly et al, “Feasibility of an 
Altruistic Sperm Donation Program in Canada: Results from a 
Population-Based Model” (2017) 14:8 Reproductive Health 1. 
32  See Stu Marvel, “‘Tony Danza Is My Sperm Donor?’: Queer Kinship 
and the Impact of Canadian Regulations Around Sperm Donation” 
(2013) 25:2 CJWL 221 at 227. 
33  See e.g. Johns, supra note 2; Hallich, supra note 2; Michelle Dennison, 
“Revealing Your Sources: The Case for Non-Anonymous Gamete 
Donation” (2007) 21:1 JL & Health 1.  
34  See Pratten, supra note 9 at para 111; Allan E Guttmacher, Francis S 
Collins & Richard H Carmona, “The Family History—More Important 
Than Ever” (2004) 351:22 N Engl J Med 2333 at 2333–34. 
35  See Guttmacher, Collins & Carmona, supra note 34 at 2333–34. 
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BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene.36 While some may argue that 
genetic testing alone is a viable alternative, all genetic 
testing is best interpreted in light of family history.37 
Moreover, for many heritable conditions that are not 
associated with specific genetic markers, experts have 
concluded that family history is often a better predictor.38 
Family history is also becoming increasingly important for 
making day-to-day health decisions that can mitigate the 
expression of genetic diseases.39 For example, if people are 
aware of a family history of heart disease, they may be 
more conscientious of their diets or be more diligent with 
their exercise regimes. If they know several family 
members have been diagnosed with colon cancer, they may 
schedule colonoscopies more regularly.  
With respect to psychological health, some DCIs 
experience sadness, frustration, and anxiety as a result of 
being unable to obtain information about their donors. One 
individual described feeling her sense of self 
“disintegrat[e]” upon learning that she was conceived 
using donor sperm.40 Others have described becoming 
depressed or obsessed with the lack of information.41 
 
36  See Cameron, Gruben & Kelly, supra note 16 at 109. 
37  See Pratten, supra note 9 at para 85; Guttmacher, Collins & Carmona, 
supra note 34 at 2334–35. 
38  See Pratten, supra note 9 at para 85; Brandie Heald, Emily Edelman 
& Charis Eng, “Prospective Comparison of Family Medical History 
with Personal Genome Screening for Risk Assessment of Common 
Cancers” (2012) 20:5 Eur J Hum Genet 547. 
39  See Cameron, Gruben & Kelly, supra note 16 at 109.  
40  Pratten, supra note 9 at para 51. 
41  See Pratten, supra note 9 at paras 38, 45, 55. 
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Several have voiced a strong desire to locate half-siblings 
in order to establish a “greater sense of identity and 
belonging.”42 Many worried about unknowingly engaging 
in intimate relations with genetically-related family 
members.43 While many DCIs are not negatively impacted 
by their manner of conception,44 secrecy surrounding one’s 
origins may lead to stress, anxiety, and frustration. 
In response to these potential harms, and in light of 
Ontario’s lack of assistance, many DCIs have taken matters 
into their own hands. For example, the DCI community has 
created a resource center called “We Are Donor 
Conceived,” which connects DCIs with support groups, 
various networks, and even to a voluntary United States-
based Donor Sibling Registry.45 The Donor Sibling 
Registry is an online space where donors and DCIs can 
register to make mutually desired contact with others who 
share their genetic origins. Unfortunately, because the 
Donor Sibling Registry is completely voluntary and 
unregulated, it is also incomplete.46 Some DCIs are taking 
a different approach to their problem and are attempting to 
track down their anonymous donors using mail-order DNA 
 
42  Jessica Lee, “Sperm Donor Anonymity: A Call for Legislative 
Reform” (2014) 33:1 Canadian Fam LQ 1 at 6. 
43  See Pratten, supra note 9 at para 100. 
44  See Tabitha Freeman, “Gamete Donation, Information Sharing and the 
Best Interests of the Child: An Overview of the Psychosocial 
Evidence” (2015) 33:1 Monash Bioeth Rev 45 at 48. 
45  See “We Are Donor Conceived”, online: We Are Donor Conceived 
<www.wearedonorconceived.com>. 
46  See Lee, supra note 42 at 9 (asserting that voluntary record keeping or 
regulation by the private sector is inadequate). 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kits and genealogy websites.47 However, this method will 
not always result in identifying a donor.48 Moreover, this 
method can be seen as an unwanted intrusion on gamete 
donors’ privacy.49 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Ontario’s 
current regime is inadequately overseeing gamete 
donation. Many advocates have argued that donor 
anonymity should be more closely regulated or even 
abolished entirely.50 Since Victoria is the only jurisdiction 
to have retrospectively removed donor anonymity, 
examining the state’s policy-making experience can 
provide important insight regarding whether a similar 
course of action should be taken in Ontario. 
DONOR ANONYMITY IN VICTORIA 
Victoria’s gamete donation scheme stands in stark contrast 
to Ontario’s. As of March 1, 2017, Victoria became the first 
jurisdiction in the world to retrospectively remove gamete 
donor anonymity.51 This section aims to paint a picture of 
how Victoria’s newly instituted scheme operates today. 
The legislative history and reasoning behind this policy 
 
47  See Joyce C Harper, Debbie Kennett & Dan Reisel, “The End of Donor 
Anonymity: How Genetic Testing is Likely to Drive Anonymous 
Gamete Donation Out of Business” (2016) 31:6 Human Reproduction 
1135 at 1137. 
48  See ibid at 1136–37. 
49  See Chung et al, supra note 8. 
50  See generally Kelly, supra note 2. 
51  See Taylor-Sands, supra note 13 at 555. 
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decision will be examined in greater detail in the 
proceeding sections.  
 At present, two separate donor registries exist in 
Victoria, both of which are managed by the Victorian 
Assisted Reproductive Treatment Authority (VARTA).52 
VARTA is a state-funded statutory authority, charged with 
overseeing assisted reproduction in Victoria.53 The first 
registry is the Central Register, which houses specific types 
of information that are prescribed by the Assisted 
Reproductive Treatment Regulations 2009.54 This includes 
information such as: the donor’s name, unique donor 
identifier, date of birth, and place of birth; the donor’s 
height, eye colour, marital status, education, and 
occupation; the number of children conceived using that 
donor’s gametes;  the donor’s blood type and any known 
genetic abnormalities; and the treatment provider’s contact 
information.55 The second registry is the Voluntary 
Register. Any party involved in donor conception may 
submit an application to the Voluntary Register. The 
applicant will indicate who they are looking to match with. 
Information may be shared once a match is made if both 
parties consent to the release of identifying information. 
The Voluntary Register may contain such things as 
 




53  See “About VARTA”, online: VARTA <www.varta.org.au/about-
varta>. 
54  See Assisted Reproductive Treatment Regulations 2009 (Vic), 
2009/117, Schedule 5 [Assisted Reproductive Treatment Regulations]. 
55  See ibid. 
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photographs, updated contact information, personal letters, 
etc.56 
 Victoria prospectively abolished gamete donor 
anonymity in 1998.57 This meant that any DCIs conceived 
after 1998 could access all of their donors’ identifying 
information contained in the Central Register once they 
turned eighteen.58 However, any gamete donor who 
donated post-1998 was made aware of this new regime and 
so was required to consent to this identity-release as part of 
the donation process. Various other countries in the world 
have prospectively abolished anonymous gamete donation 
in a similar fashion, such as the United Kingdom.59  
However, Victoria’s 2017 amendments took the 
abolition of anonymity one step further. They extended the 
right to access identifying information in the Central 
Register to all DCIs in Victoria, regardless of when they 
were conceived, and regardless of whether their gamete 
 
56  VARTA, “The Voluntary Register”, online: VARTA 
<www.varta.org.au/information-support/donor-conception/donor-
conception-register-services/donor-conception-registers>. 
57  The legislation also provided that DCIs conceived between 1988 and 
1998 could access their donor’s information if the donor consented. 
This was done through the Voluntary Register, and the ability was later 
extended to DCIs born before 1988, as well. As a result, the Voluntary 
Register became accessible to all DCIs, regardless of when they were 
conceived, so long as all relevant parties consent to the information 
release. See Taylor-Sands, supra note 13 at 557–58.  
58  See Taylor-Sands, supra note 13 at 558. 
59  See The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure 
of Donor Information) Regulations 2004 (UK), SI 2004/1511. 
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donor consents to the release of his or her information.60 
As a result, all Victorian DCIs can now apply to the Central 
Register in order to receive identifying and/or non-
identifying information about their donor once they turn 
eighteen, or earlier if they have parental consent or if a 
VARTA counsellor considers them to be sufficiently 
mature.61  
When a DCI applies to the Central Register to 
obtain information about his or her donor, the DCI will first 
be required to go to a free information-and-support session, 
conducted by a qualified VARTA counsellor. During this 
session, the DCI is encouraged to fill out a Statement of 
Reasons, describing their motivations for seeking 
information and what they hope to gain out of their 
application in both the short- and long-term. This form is 
forwarded to the donor in order to help them understand 
why the DCI is seeking further information.62 
In crafting their applications to the Central 
Register, DCIs may request to receive non-identifying 
information, identifying information, or both. Before 
releasing any identifying information, VARTA will use 
 
60  Donors can also apply to the Central Register for information about 
their DCIs.  
61  Parents may apply to access information about their child’s donor 
while the child is still a minor. However, this will only be provided if 
the donor consents. See VARTA, “Access to information about the 
donor”, online: VARTA <www.varta.org.au/information-
support/donor-conception/donor-conception-register-services/access-
information-about>. 
62  See VARTA, “Information and support session”, online: VARTA 
<www.varta.org.au/information-support/donor-conception/donor-
conception-register-services/information-and-support>. 
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best efforts to inform the donor of the DCI’s application for 
information. Where necessary, such efforts may include 
conducting basic internet and social-media searches, 
inspecting electoral rolls, perusing name-change databases, 
looking through the White Pages, examining death 
indexes, performing land title searches, inspecting probate 
files and immigration registers, or even contracting third-
party search agencies.63 If VARTA is unable to locate the 
donor after four months, DCIs are provided with their 
donor’s identifying information on two conditions. First, 
they must undertake not to contact the donor. Second, they 
must agree to provide VARTA with any subsequent 
information that they may discover regarding the donor’s 
location.64  
If VARTA is able to make contact with the donor, 
the donor and his or her family will be offered free 
counselling. The donor will also be informed that they may 
lodge a contact preference form, which permits donors to 
detail how they would like to be contacted by DCIs. 
Contact options include, but are not limited to, phone calls, 
letters, non-identifying e-mail addresses, or attending in-
 




64  See VARTA, “Information for Donor-Conceived People Conceived 
from Donations Made Before 1998: Application to the Central 
Register” (July 2019) at 1, online (pdf): VARTA 
<www.varta.org.au/resources/information-sheets/making-application-
central-register> [perma.cc/XXU9-67S3]. 
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person meetings facilitated by a VARTA counsellor. 65 The 
donor may also specify that he or she wants no contact at 
all. 66 However, requesting no contact does not prevent the 
release of their identifying information. The donor’s 
contact preference is legally enforceable, and DCIs must 
sign an undertaking that they will comply with their 
donor’s contact preference prior to receiving any 
identifying information from VARTA.67 In theory, a donor 
could take a DCI who disregards the contact preference to 
court. However, as of the date of writing, no such 
applications have been filed.  
In sum, the Victorian scheme is quite sensitive to 
DCIs’ interests68 and provides a safe and reliable way for 
all DCIs to access information that may be important for 
 




66  See “Information for Donor-Conceived People Conceived from 
Donations Made Before 1998: Application to the Central Register”, 
supra note 64. 
67  See Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008, supra note 10, ss 63C–
63G. See also “Information for Donor-Conceived People Conceived 
from Donations Made Before 1998: Application to the Central 
Register”, supra note 64. 
68  See generally Austl, Vic, VARTA, Consultation with Donors Who 
Donated Gametes in Victoria, Australia Before 1998: Access by 
Donor-Conceived People to Information About Donors (Report to the 
Victorian Government) (Melbourne: VARTA, 2013) at 15–17 
[VARTA, Consultation with Donors]. Notably, some donors expressed 
support for the retrospective amendments because they believe in the 
importance of disclosure, and/or because they were interested in 
obtaining information about their DCIs, themselves. 
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their physical and psychological well-being. However, the 
2017 amendments have been criticized for inadequately 
protecting gamete donors. For example, lodging a no-
contact preference does not prevent online stalking via 
unregulated social media websites.69 Furthermore, if a DCI 
disregards the no-contact preference, any subsequent legal 
enforcement will not necessarily undo the harms that may 
be caused by the initial contact. Many donors have not 
informed their families that they once donated their 
gametes and worry that this revelation may disintegrate 
their family unit.70 Even where contact between the donor 
and the DCI does not occur, the release of identifying 
information without consent nevertheless violates donors’ 
legitimate expectations of privacy. Lack of contact does 
not negate the fact that they are no longer anonymous. 
Many donors only agreed to donate their gametes because 
they were assured anonymity.71 They did not suspect that 
their privacy rights would be retrospectively removed.  
ISSUES WITH RETROSPECTIVE LAWS 
Much ink has been spilt discussing the problems associated 
with retrospective laws.72 While a thorough examination of 
 
69  See Taylor-Sands, supra note 13 at 562. 
70  See VARTA, Consultation with Donors, supra note 68 at 44. 
71  See ibid at 60. 
72  See generally Elmer A Driedger’s discussion of distinction between 
retrospective and retroactive in “Statutes: Retroactive Retrospective 
Reflections” (1978) 56:2 Can Bar Rev 264 at 268–269. There is some 
confusion concerning the appropriate use of these two terms, and while 
Driedger distinguishes the two concepts, this distinction has not been 
applied consistently. As a result, the terms are often used 
interchangeably. For the sake of uniformity, this paper will use the term 
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the literature on this topic is beyond the scope of this paper, 
this section will nevertheless provide a brief overview of 
one of the main criticisms of retrospectivity: its 
incompatibility with the rule of law. Despite being a widely 
respected principle, a precise and concise definition of the 
rule of law is hard to articulate.73 Broadly stated, the rule 
of law is a normative concept that all persons should be 
ruled by law equally. To achieve this, laws should be well-
defined, public, stable, and evenly applied.74   
It is easy to see how retrospective legislation might 
violate these aspirational characteristics and thereby 
undermine the rule of law. For example, under the rule of 
law, a well-functioning legal system should allow people 
to form reasonable expectations about the legal 
consequences of their actions. Where such guidance is not 
provided, citizens cannot make meaningful decisions about 
their actions. Similarly, where an individual chooses to act 
based on a reasonable expectation of privacy, but the law 
is subsequently changed to attach different consequences 
to the individual’s chosen course of action, the basis of 
their decision-making is gravely undermined.75 This is, 
 
retrospective, throughout, to refer to a law that “attaches new legal 
effects to situations that had occurred entirely or partly in the past.” 
Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed 
(Markham: Lexis Nexis, 2008) at 670, cited in Gruben, supra note 6 at 
161. 
73  See Jeff Yates, Andrew B Whitford & David Brown, “Perceptions of 
the Rule of Law: Evidence on the Impact of Judicial Insulation” (2019) 
100:1 Soc Science Q 198. 
74  See Charles Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), ch 2. 
75  See ibid, ch 3. 
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quite simply, unfair—“it is unfair to establish rules, invite 
people to rely on them, then change them in mid-stream, 
especially if the change results in negative 
consequences.”76 This scenario also engages the principle 
of adequate notice. To be guided by laws, citizens must 
first be aware of these laws. Of course, an individual cannot 
have adequate notice of a law that will not be created until 
several years after they make the decision in question.77  
Broader, systemic problems can also arise from 
disregarding the principles that underpin the rule of law. A 
retrospective law “undercuts the integrity of rules 
prospective in effect, since it puts them under the threat of 
retrospective change.”78 In other words, because 
individuals cannot trust that the effect of current laws will 
not change in the future, the general public confidence in 
law might be eroded. Such distrust could even extend to the 
government at large.79 
Given its potential to attract grave philosophical 
and practical consequences, the decision to enact 
retrospective legislation should not be undertaken lightly. 
These special circumstances arguably heighten the 
government’s responsibility to rely on solid evidence and 
airtight reasoning in their decision-making. As a result, if 
Ontario is to follow Victoria’s course of action with respect 
to retrospectively removing donor anonymity, it should 
 
76  Sullivan, supra note 72 at 668, cited in Gruben, supra note 6 at 162. 
77  See Gruben, supra note 6 at 162. 
78  Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1969) at 39, cited in Sampford, supra note 74 at 58. 
79  See Taylor-Sands, supra note 13 at 562. 
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only do so if it has thoroughly considered all the benefits 
and disadvantages that might accompany such a drastic 
change.  
SHOULD ONTARIO FOLLOW SUIT? 
 This paper argues that Victoria’s policy choice to 
retrospectively remove donor anonymity ought not be 
emulated by Ontario. To support this thesis, this section 
will first review the jurisdictions’ opposing historical 
approaches to overseeing gamete donation. It will then 
conduct an in-depth examination of Victoria’s policy 
decision, arguing that the amendments were not evidence-
based. As a result, Ontario should conduct its own research 
into how de-anonymized gamete donation might affect the 
various stakeholders prior to taking any legislative action. 
Finally, this section will argue that Victoria relied on an ill-
suited framework of reasoning when arriving at its policy 
decision. Ontario should avoid using Victoria’s harm-
based approach and should instead opt to employ relational 
ethics when considering how to best proceed. 
A) CONSIDERING HISTORY 
Scholars of comparative law have long since cautioned 
about the dangers of mindless legal transplantation.80 
Although there continues to be disagreement concerning 
the extent to which socio-cultural differences affect the 
ability to successfully compare, adopt, and adapt different 
 
80  See Helen Xanthaki, “Legal Transplants in Legislation: Defusing the 
Trap” (2008) 57:3 ICLQ 659. 
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legal regimes,81 it can nevertheless be informative to 
consider jurisdictional differences and how these 
differences may affect the implementation of the 
amendments in question. While an exhaustive comparison 
of Victoria and Ontario’s legal climates is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it may be helpful to briefly review the 
jurisdictions’ legal histories with respect to the oversight of 
gamete donation—and, in particular, to highlight their 
differences. 
As discussed, Ontario has not created any 
regulations pertaining specifically to donor anonymity. 
The only relevant piece of legislation that ever touched 
donors’ anonymity rights was section 18(3) of the original 
AHRA, which provided that identifying information about 
a donor could not be disclosed to gamete recipients without 
the donor’s consent.82 In other words, the only law that was 
ever in place actually protected Ontarian donors’ 
anonymity rights. Though this section was subsequently 
repealed, no alternative stipulations have been put into 
place by the Ontario government. Ontario donors therefore 
continue to enjoy a right to privacy in their identifying 
information, since the personal information collected 
during gamete donation is not distinguished from personal 
information that would be collected for any other medical 
procedure. While in practice their anonymity may be 
threatened through DCIs’ use of direct-to-consumer DNA 
testing, like 23andMe, their privacy rights have always 
 
81  See Toby S Goldbach, “Instrumentalizing the Expressive: 
Transplanting Sentencing Circles into the Canadian Criminal Trial” 
(2015) 25:1 Transnat'l L & Contemp Probs 61 at 93–95.  
82  See AHRA, supra note 19, s 18(3). 
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been upheld by the government, whether explicitly or 
implicitly.  
Ontario has, however, enacted retrospective 
legislation with respect to adoption. In 2008, an adoption-
information disclosure law was passed, enabling adopted 
adults over the age of eighteen to apply for identifying 
information through Service Ontario.83 Birth parents can 
also apply for identifying information if the adopted child 
is over nineteen.84 Similar to Victoria’s scheme for gamete 
donation, parties can file a Notice of Contact Preference 
indicating how they would like to be contacted.85 They can 
also file a No Contact Notice if they are willing to share 
identifying information but do not wish to be contacted.86 
However, unlike the Victorian scheme, if the adoption took 
place before September 2008, the birth parents and/or 
adopted adults may submit a Disclosure Veto. This 
Disclosure Veto would prevent the release of any 
identifying information.87 In other words, if the adoption 
took place prior to the legislation coming into force, birth 
parents and adopted individuals are entitled to retain their 
privacy if they so choose. Therefore, despite being 
 
83  See Bill 12, An Act to amend the Vital Statistics Act in relation to 
adoption information and to make consequential amendments to the 
Child and Family Services Act, 1st Sess, 39th Parl, Ontario, 2008 
(assented to 14 May 2008), SO 2008, c 5 (the amendments); Vital 
Statistics Act, RSO 1990, c V4, s 48.1 (the present-day section 
providing for disclosure to the adopted person). 
84  See Vital Statistics Act, supra note 83, s 48.2. 
85  See ibid, s 48.3. 
86  See ibid, s 48.2–48.5. 
87  See ibid. 
 RETROSP. REMOVAL OF DONOR ANONYMITY 277 
 
retroactive, a clear mechanism for protecting previous 
promises of privacy is incorporated into the legislation. 
Moreover, it does not necessarily follow that the 
government will extend such a scheme to DCIs. In Pratten 
v British Columbia (AG), a DCI claimed that her section 15 
equality rights had been breached because adopted children 
in British Colombia had legislated protections that did not 
extend to DCIs. She also claimed that the practice of 
anonymous gamete donation violated her section 7 Charter 
right to life, liberty, and security of the person because this 
section encompassed the right to know her genetic origins. 
The British Colombia Court of Appeal agreed with the trial 
judge and dismissed Ms. Pratten’s section 7 claim, finding 
that there was no constitutionally protected positive right 
to know ones biological origins.88 It further overturned the 
trial judge’s holding on the section 15(1) claim and held 
instead that the adoption-related provisions were protected 
by section 15(2) of the Charter, which precludes using 
section 15 to strike down legislative schemes that have an 
ameliorative or remedial purpose targeting another 
disadvantaged group.89 As a result, it was “open to the 
Legislature to provide adoptees with the means of 
accessing information about their biological origins 
without being obligated to provide comparable benefits to 
other persons seeking such information.”90 Leave to appeal 
 
88  See Pratten, supra note 9 at para 316; Pratten v British Columbia 
(Attorney General), 2012 BCCA 480 at para 7 [Pratten BCCA]. 
89  See R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 at para 41. 
90  Pratten BCCA, supra note 88 at para 42. 
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the case to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied.91 
Notably, because this case was brought in British 
Colombia, it is not binding in Ontario.  
Overall, Ontario gamete donors have never had 
their privacy rights seriously questioned by either the 
federal or the provincial government. The story in Victoria 
is very different. The Victorian government has been 
overseeing gamete donation for decades. In 1982 it 
established the Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical, 
and Legal Issues Arising From In Vitro Fertilization in 
order to investigate the regulation of assisted reproduction 
in Victoria.92 Based off the committee’s findings, the 
Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984 came into force 
in 1988.93 The Act required medical practitioners to collect 
specific information about gamete donors.94 This 
information was to be stored in a central register. The 
scheme also provided that DCIs could access their donors’ 
identifying information once they turned eighteen, if the 
donor consented to this release of information.95 In line 
with this, some fertility-treatment providers began 
including a special box on their intake forms, asking 
 
91  Pratten v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2012 BCCA 480, leave 
to appeal to SCC refused, 35191 (30 May 2013).  
92  See Austl, Victoria, Law Reform Committee, Inquiry into Access by 
Donor-Conceived People to Information about Donors, Parl Paper No 
120 (2012) at 14 [Inquiry into Access]. 
93  Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act 1984 (Vic), 1984/10163. 
94  See ibid at ss 19ff. 
95  See Taylor-Sands, supra note 13 at 557–58. 
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whether the donors consented to such identity release.96 
Some providers even went so far as to only recruit donors 
who were willing to be known to offspring.97 Therefore, as 
early as 1988, the Victorian scheme was already more 
concerned with openness than Ontario’s legislation is 
today. 
As of January 1, 1998, with the Infertility 
Treatment Act 1995, the Victorian government 
prospectively ended anonymous gamete donation.98 This 
meant that, going forward, every donor had to consent to 
identity-release to be eligible to donate. All DCIs 
conceived after 1998 could therefore obtain identifying 
information about their donors once they turned eighteen, 
or at a younger age with their parents’ consent.99 Once 
again, this prospective legislation, enacted more than two 
decades ago, provided Victorian DCIs with far more access 
to information rights than any Ontarian DCIs currently 
possess. 
Changing attitudes towards donor conception led to 
the enactment of further amendments in 2015.100 The main 
goal of the 2015 amendments was to provide DCIs 
conceived before 1988 (i.e., those conceived before 
Victoria entered the legislative sphere at all) with the same 
access to information that was afforded to DCIs conceived 
 
96  See History of Donor Conception Records in Victoria, supra note 10 
at 7. 
97  See ibid.   
98  See ibid; Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic), 1995/63. 
99  See Taylor-Sands, supra note 13 at 558. 
100  See ibid at 558–60. 
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after 1988 but before 1998.101 To enable this, fertility 
treatment providers were required submit their relevant, 
pre-1988 records to the Central Register.102 However, the 
legislative scheme provided that donors would have to 
consent to the release of their identifying information.103 In 
other words, donors who donated under a promise of 
anonymity any time before 1998 were still able to retain 
their privacy. 
Though donor anonymity was still preserved at this 
stage, the consultations conducted as part of the evidence-
gathering process for the 2015 amendments seriously 
considered whether anonymity should be retrospectively 
abolished.104 The Law Reform Committee called for 
written submissions and held six separate public 
consultations, gathering information from a wide array of 
stakeholders including DCIs, donors, and medical 
professionals.105 Extensive public advertising was used to 
encourage anonymous donors to share their opinions about 
having their identities revealed.106 As a result, from as early 
as 2011, donors were notified that their privacy was being 
called into question by the government. It was not until the 
 
101  See History of Donor Conception Records in Victoria, supra note 10 
at 8. 
102  See ibid at 8–9. 
103  See Taylor-Sands, supra note 13 at 560. 
104  See Victorian Government Response, supra note 12 at 2, 5–6. 
105  See Inquiry into Access, supra note 92 at 8. 
106  See VARTA, Consultation with Donors, supra note 68 at 11. 
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final set of amendments were passed in 2017 that these 
rights were retrospectively removed.107  
Understanding Victoria’s entire legislative history 
is important because it demonstrates that the Victorian 
government did not jump straight from zero oversight to 
retrospective removal. Rather, over the course of more than 
three decades, the legislature incrementally and 
purposefully adjusted its policies. The incremental nature 
of the reform has resulted in donor information being 
uniformly collected and stored in one place in Victoria 
since 1988.108 As a result, DCIs conceived after 1988 are 
assured that the government actually possesses a baseline 
of information about their donors. This is not the case in 
Ontario. Even if donor anonymity were to be 
retrospectively removed, many DCIs would sadly discover 
that pertinent information about their donors was either 
destroyed, never collected, or held in an international 
jurisdiction.109 Therefore, if retrospective legislation were 
created in Ontario, it could nevertheless be difficult to 
achieve a fully functioning retrospective system.  
Ultimately, this brief review highlights that Ontario 
and Victoria fall on opposite ends of the spectrum with 
respect to their historic oversight of gamete donation. If 
Ontario were to move forward with adopting Victoria’s 
legislative scheme, it could be useful to conduct a more 
fulsome examination of any other pertinent differences that 
 
107  See Taylor-Sands, “Removing Donor Anonymity”, supra note 13 at 
561. 
108  See History of Donor Conception Records in Victoria, supra note 10 
at 7–8. 
109  See e.g. Pratten, supra note 9 at para 2. 
282 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 33, 2020] 
 
might exist between the two jurisdictions and to further 
explore how all these distinctions might impact the 
successful implementation of Victoria’s amendments 
within Ontario.  
B) LACK OF EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT 
In 2011, the Law Reform Committee for the “Inquiry into 
Access by Donor-Conceived People to Information about 
Donors” was assembled by the Victorian government and 
given a mandate “to consider appropriate measures to 
reconcile conflicts between the contemporary practice that 
requires disclosure of information to donor-conceived 
people, and an historical tradition that did not.”110 In other 
words, the Law Reform Committee was asked how to best 
address the differences in rights afforded to DCIs, based on 
their date of conception. At that time, DCIs conceived 
before 1988 had no legislated rights. DCIs conceived 
between 1988 and 1998 had the right to access non-
identifying information that was stored in the Central 
Register, as well as the right to access identifying 
information if their donors consented. Finally, DCIs 
conceived post-1998 had the right to access both 
identifying and non-identifying information from the 
register.  
In order to determine what course of action the 
Victorian government ought to take to reconcile these 
differences, the Law Reform Committee called for written 
submissions (receiving seventy-seven), and held six 
different public consultations (hearing from fifty-one 
 
110  Inquiry into Access, supra note 92 at xvii. 
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different witnesses).111 In total, it heard from a wide array 
of stakeholders, including “donors, donor-conceived 
persons, recipient parents, academics, and representatives 
from government agencies, fertility clinics, medical 
associations and support groups.”112 Writing over two 
hundred pages, the Law Reform Committee’s final report 
on the matter weighed the harms to DCIs against the harms 
that may befall donors and concluded “that the welfare and 
interests of persons born as a result of assisted reproductive 
treatment procedures are paramount.”113 Based on this 
conclusion, the Law Reform Committee recommended 
“that the Victorian Government introduce legislation to 
allow all donor-conceived people to obtain identifying 
information about their donors.”114 
However, the Law Reform Committee’s report did 
not initially prove to be all that persuasive. Despite hearing 
from a variety of key informants, only nine donors were 
consulted.115 As a result, the Victorian government issued 
an interim response stating that further information needed 
to be gathered from donors prior to taking any legislative 
 
111  See ibid at 8. 
112  Ibid at xix. 
113  Ibid at xviii. 
114  Ibid at 76. 
115  See Austl, Victoria, Whole of Government Interim Response to the 
Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee Inquiry into Access by 
Donor-Conceived People to Information about Donors (Melbourne, 
2012) at 2. 
284 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 33, 2020] 
 
action, given how significantly the donors’ rights could be 
impacted.116  
VARTA was charged with consulting donors about 
their opinions on the Law Reform Commission’s 
recommendation.117 In order to recruit donors, it launched 
an extensive advertising and media campaign, which ran in 
print and radio for two months.118 Forty-two eligible 
donors responded, seven of whom had also made 
submissions to the Law Reform Committee. VARTA 
acknowledged that: 
[b]ecause records of donations are 
incomplete, the total number of donors is 
unknown and it is impossible to assess 
whether these 42 donors constitute a 
representative sample. However, the 
diversity of characteristics, the range of 
opinions, and the inclusion of donors who 
have not previously made their views known 
suggest that the results represent more than a 
narrow segment of donors.119  
VARTA used semi-structured interviews to find 
that more than half of the canvassed donors rejected the 
Law Reform Commission’s recommendation. These 
donors largely stated that retrospective removal was akin 
to “a breach of contract and would undermine trust in 
 
116  See ibid at 1–2.   
117  See VARTA, Consultation with Donors, supra note 68 at 5. 
118  See ibid at 11. 
119  Ibid at 5. 
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guarantees of privacy and confidentiality as well as 
government.”120 These donors also expressed significant 
concerns about how the legislative scheme could harm 
them and their families.121 One donor described 
retrospective identity-release as “a dreadful betrayal of an 
altruistic act.”122 Several donors who were themselves 
willing to be identified nevertheless opposed the 
recommendation on the basis that it was wrong to 
retrospectively change the law.123 As a middle ground, 
about a quarter of interviewed donors proposed increasing 
efforts to have donors come forward voluntarily, rather 
than legally compelling them to do so.124  
 In its final report, VARTA did not provide any of 
its own opinions regarding whether retrospective 
legislation should be enacted. It merely laid out the 
evidence that had been gathered from anonymous donors. 
The Victorian government weighed the new evidence itself 
and concluded that identifying information should only be 
released with the consent of the donors.125 Based on the 
evidence, the Victorian government posited that: (1) most 
donors would consent to releasing their identifying 
information if they were given the choice to do so; (2) 
where donors refuse to reveal information, the provision of 
non-identifying information could still help DCIs 
 
120  Victorian Government Response, supra note 12 at 4. 
121  See Consultation with Donors, supra note 68 at 5. 
122  Ibid at 17. 
123  See ibid at 19. 
124  See ibid. 
125  See Victorian Government Response, supra note 12 at 5. 
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overcome many of their identity issues; and (3) even if 
donors were compelled to disclose their identifying 
information, there would be no guarantee that the pre-1988 
information would be available, complete, or accurate.126 
Based on these conclusions, the 2015 amendments were 
created. The 2015 amendments legislated a right for DCIs 
born before 1988 to access identifying information if 
donors consented to the release. They also created 
provisions for gathering and securing pre-1988 donor 
records from fertility providers.127 Overall, the Victorian 
government believed this model respected donors’ privacy 
and choices and acknowledged the context within which 
donors originally consented.128  
 Only a few months after the 2015 amendments 
came into force, however, a new government was elected. 
Without gathering any further evidence, the new 
government retrospectively removed donor anonymity, 
thereby fulfilling one of its election promises.129 This 
course of action strongly suggests that Victoria’s policy 
change was a politicized move, as opposed to an evidence-
based decision. Even if the newly elected party was acting 
upon the will of the people, it is potentially problematic to 
infringe donors’ privacy rights due to a political platform, 
given the serious impacts associated with enacting 
retrospective legislation. 
 
126  See ibid. 
127  See History of Donor Conception Records in Victoria, supra note 10 
at 9. 
128  See Victorian Government Response, supra note 12 at 5. 
129  See Taylor-Sands, supra note 13 at 560–61.  
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 Furthermore, it is far less persuasive for Ontario to 
follow another country’s politicized move than it would be 
for the province to adopt an amendment grounded in sound 
research. While Victoria’s population may largely support 
the amendments, not much is known about how Ontario 
citizens feel or how they would like their own government 
to act. It is difficult to extrapolate Victorians’ opinions to 
Ontarians, considering the vastly different gamete donation 
cultures that exist between the two jurisdictions. These 
discrepancies are so stark that, even if Victoria’s decision 
had been based on evidence, it would nevertheless be 
important for Ontario to canvass its own residents and 
undertake its own fact-finding processes. Donors here may 
feel differently than donors there.  
 This distinction also applies to any evidence that 
may one day be collected post-amendment, regarding how 
Victorian donors are actually faring under this new 
identity-release regime. At present, not enough evidence 
has been collected to truly understand how the new 
legislation is affecting the parties involved, including 
previously anonymous donors and DCIs. This gap in 
knowledge is likely due to the relatively brief period of 
time that has elapsed between the time of enactment and 
the time of writing. Even once this information becomes 
available, however, it should not be assumed that the same 
effects would follow in Ontario. The potential impacts of 
the jurisdictions’ different gamete donation histories ought 
not be thoughtlessly dismissed. 
C) ILL-SUITED REASONING 
In analyzing the qualitative evidence gathered from donors 
and DCIs, the Law Reform Commission largely undertook 
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a harms-based approach.130 In sum, it identified the harms 
that both donors and DCIs were experiencing or could 
potentially experience and weighed these harms against 
one another to decide which group ought to be protected by 
the new legislative scheme. We see direct evidence of this 
reasoning in the following quote from the Law Reform 
Committee’s report: 
While the release of identifying information 
to donor-conceived people may potentially 
cause discomfort and distress to donors 
(although this will not always be the case), it 
is certain that donor-conceived people are 
actually suffering from their lack of 
knowledge about donors . . . In the 
Committee’s view, the burden of suffering 
under current arrangements falls 
predominantly on the donor-conceived 
person.131  
This type of reasoning, which pitted donors against DCIs, 
led to the conclusion that the interests of DCIs ought to be 
paramount.132 In turn, this conclusion formed the basis for 
the Law Reform Committee’s recommendation to create 
retrospective amendments.133 Since the 2017 amendments 
reflected the Law Reform Committee’s recommendation 
quite precisely, it is assumed that the Victorian government 
 
130  See ibid at 564. 
131  Inquiry into Access, supra note 92 at 73–74.  
132  See ibid at xviii. 
133  See ibid at xvii–xviii. 
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also adopted the Law Reform Committee’s harm-based 
reasoning as its own.  
However, an approach that sets one party against 
the other fails to appreciate the inter-relatedness of the 
interests at hand, despite donors and DCIs seeking 
seemingly opposing results (i.e., being anonymous vs. 
being identified). Put differently, by focusing on weighted 
harms and end-outcomes, Victoria’s reasoning 
insufficiently engaged with how relational aspects 
underpin the interests and well-being of both donors and 
DCIs. Without considering these relational underpinnings, 
it can be reductive to conclude that a retrospective identity-
release scheme is the most beneficial set-up for DCIs. 
DCI interests may “not in fact be promoted in any 
significant way if the state were to provide the identifying 
details of a donor who was not open to further information 
exchange or ongoing contact.”134 Each DCI’s motivation 
for wanting to identify their donor is unique. As such, some 
DCIs’ needs may be perfectly met by Victoria’s existing 
set-up. However, in other instances, harms resulting from 
not knowing one’s donor or not knowing one’s origins may 
not be sufficiently quelled by the provision of a name on a 
paper.135 It could be distressing to learn that a donor wants 
no contact, or to have a contact experience go poorly.136 
 
134   Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Donor Conception: Ethical Aspects of 
Information Sharing (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2013) at 
xxvi [Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Donor Conception]. 
135  See Taylor-Sands, supra note 13 at 579. 
136  See ibid. 
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Victoria’s weighing-the-harms approach led to the 
creation of legally enforceable contact preference forms. 
This mechanism attempts to protect donors from undue 
interference while still allowing DCIs to identify their 
donors. However, from a relational perspective, everybody 
loses when it comes to no-contact preference forms. For 
DCIs, it can be incredibly stressful to discover that a donor 
has requested no contact and may leave them with more 
questions than answers.137 In turn, donors are also 
insufficiently protected by this mechanism. Lodging a no-
contact preference does not prevent against “invisible” 
privacy intrusions—for example, extensive social media 
following or staging strategic run-ins without making 
oneself known.138 While most DCIs will likely respect the 
contact preference form, this cannot be guaranteed. In the 
event that a DCI disregards the no-contact preference, 
subsequent legal enforcement will not necessarily undo the 
harms that may have been caused by the initial contact. 
Overall, this set-up “presents a genuine threat to the 
relationships between relevant stakeholders, which lie at 
the heart of donor conception.”139  
This approach neglects the fundamental idea that 
“donor conception is first and foremost about people . . . 
‘People’, in turn, do not exist in isolation but within a web 
of relationships with one another.”140 Rather than viewing 
the stakeholders’ interests as falling on opposing ends of a 
 
137  See Taylor-Sands, supra note 13 at 563. 
138  See ibid at 562. 
139  Ibid at 578. 
140  Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Donor Conception, supra note 134 at 
87.  
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scale, a better analogy is to that of complex web. Within 
this web, DCI and donor interests sometimes conflict and 
sometimes coincide, but are always related to one 
another.141 In terms of theoretical reasoning, Michelle 
Taylor-Sands argues that, based on the aforementioned 
factors, this subject matter is better analyzed using a 
relational ethics lens, as opposed to a harms-based 
approach.142 
Relational ethics considers what actions are ethical 
or appropriate by analyzing the situation explicitly within 
the context of the relationships at play.143 It recognizes that 
human connection is a critical aspect of ethics.144 
According to this theoretical framework, an overemphasis 
on the individual can paint a false picture because it ignores 
the fundamental interconnectedness of all aspects of life.145 
As such, the goal of relational ethics is to arrive at a “fitting 
response” which accounts for the relational complexity of 
the situation, and which is “suitable, balanced, and 
harmonious.”146 
  In terms of its application to donor conception, 
Michelle Taylor-Sands argues that this framework is more 
 
141  See Taylor-Sands, supra note 13 at 577. 
142  See Taylor-Sands, supra note 13. 
143  See Wendy J Austin, “Relational Ethics” in Lisa M Given, ed, The 
SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods, 2nd ed 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc, 2008) 748 at 748–49. 
144  See Diane Kunyk & Wendy Austin, “Nursing Under the Influence: A 
Relational Ethics Perspective” (2012) 19:3 Nursing Ethics 380 at 382.  
145  See Austin, supra note 143 at 749. 
146  See ibid at 748. 
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appropriate than Victoria’s harms-based approach because 
it enables DCI interests to be 
considered alongside those of donors and 
their families and recipient parents, thereby 
promoting the very relationships that are at 
stake in donor conception. A relational model 
also emphasises the need for a flexible 
approach to accommodate the longitudinal 
needs of individuals as their relationships 
change and evolve over time.147 
The approach is particularly suitable to this subject 
matter because “many of the interests in donor conception 
‘arise specifically in the context of the relationships (actual 
and potential) that may exist between the different 
parties.’”148 As a result, relational ethics emphasizes the 
importance of cultivating healthy relationships between 
donors and DCIs, as opposed to creating legislative 
“winners” and “losers.” 
This paper does not attempt to define or prescribe 
what constitutes a healthy relationship. Rather, the concept 
will vary depending on each individual circumstance and 
can encompass everything from complete ambivalence to 
close familial bonds. The state cannot compel these healthy 
relationships (regardless of whether they are close or 
distant; warm or formal). However, the government can 
create legislation aimed at enabling or fostering this 
outcome. Arguably, a scheme that explicitly subordinates 
 
147  Taylor-Sands, supra note 13 at 579. 
148  Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Donor Conception, supra note 134 at 
xix, cited in Taylor-Sands, supra note 13 at 577. 
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one party’s interests to the other’s does not form the best 
foundation. Instead, the next section attempts to make 
policy recommendations for Ontario stemming from a 
relational ethics perspective. These recommendations take 
into consideration the complex and inter-related interests at 
hand and are aimed at maximizing improvements for all 
parties involved while simultaneously fostering a legal 
environment where healthy relationships can thrive. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
Based on the foregoing, Victoria does not set an 
appropriate example for Ontario to emulate. Ontario should 
not follow suit and retrospectively remove donor 
anonymity. It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine 
whether Ontario should prospectively abolish donor 
anonymity. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the status quo 
is insufficiently protecting Ontario DCIs who have already 
been conceived—i.e., those DCIs who would not benefit 
from any prospective removal of donor anonymity. 
Ameliorative action is therefore required and Ontario 
should learn from Victoria’s mistakes by ensuring that any 
legislative reform is founded on sound empirical evidence 
and a clear ethical framework.149  
In line with these principles, this paper makes two 
recommendations aimed at improving outcomes for DCIs 
in Ontario, without subordinating the interests of gamete 
donors. These recommendations reflect the limited 
evidence that is presently available. It would be prudent for 
Ontario to gather further evidence from experts, key 
stakeholders, and the general public prior to proceeding 
 
149  See ibid at 578. 
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with any legislative reform. This paper’s recommendations 
were also crafted using a relational ethics approach. This 
approach recognizes that the parties’ interests are complex, 
inter-related, and ever evolving. By situating an analysis of 
the problem within a relational context, the resulting 
recommendations seek to provide practical improvements 
for DCIs within a legal environment is that conducive to 
fostering healthy relationships.  
The first recommendation is that Ontario invest 
increased resources into raising public awareness and 
education with respect to the physical and potentially 
psychological importance of disclosing donor information 
to DCIs. To be clear, many DCIs are not negatively 
impacted by their manner of conception.150 However, some 
have testified to experiencing associated psychological 
issues,151 and the medical benefits of knowing one’s family 
history can be significant.152 Furthermore, various key 
informants have championed the overall benefits of 
disclosure.153 Openness therefore constitutes a laudable 
goal to pursue within the province.  
 
150  See Freeman, supra note 43 at 48; Joanna E Scheib & Alice Ruby, 
“Impact of Sperm Donor Information on Parents and Children” (2006) 
4:1 Sexuality, Reproduction & Menopause 17 at 17. 
151  See Pratten, supra note 9 at paras 38, 45, 51, 55. 
152  See ibid at paras 85, 11. 
153  See Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine, “Informing Offspring of Their Conception by Gamete or 
Embryo Donation: An Ethics Committee Opinion” (2018) 109:4 
Fertility & Sterility 601 at 602; Ken Daniels, “Donor Gametes: 
Anonymous or Identified?” (2006) 21:1 Best Practice & Research: 
Clinical Obstetrics & Gynaecology 113 at 124–25; Patricia P 
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The proposed compromise of encouraging 
voluntary disclosure was raised by several donors 
consulted by VARTA.154 Increasing education and 
awareness could encourage more donors to come forward 
voluntarily, which is preferable to legally compelling them 
to do so.155 This approach could also facilitate gathering 
more accurate and up-to-date information, as opposed to 
providing DCIs with records from fertility clinics that are 
decades old and usually outdated—a phenomenon which 
often occurs under the Victorian regime.156 Moreover, this 
set-up avoids taking an “all-or-nothing” approach to 
information disclosure. Donors who feel uncomfortable 
sharing identifying information can still share newly 
acquired medical information, which can be pivotal for the 
physical well-being of DCIs. 
This paper advocates for a voluntary, as opposed to 
a mandatory, information-sharing scheme between donors 
and DCIs.157 From a relational perspective, voluntary 
information sharing is more conducive to fostering healthy 
 
Mahlstedt, Kathleen LaBounty & William Thomas Kennedy, “The 
Views of Adult Offspring of Sperm Donation: Essential Feedback for 
the Development of Ethical Guidelines Within the Practice of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology in the United States” (2010) 93:7 Fertility & 
Sterility 2236. 
154  See Victorian Government Response, supra note 12 at 4. 
155  See VARTA, Consultation with Donors, supra note 68 at 19. 
156  See Taylor-Sands, supra note 13 at 580. 
157  To be clear, this paper advocates for voluntary information-sharing 
between donors and DCIs who have already been conceived, as 
opposed to instituting a mandatory, retrospective information-sharing 
regime. This paper does not take a position on whether mandatory 
information-sharing should be instituted prospectively in Ontario.  
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relationships. However, for a voluntary information-
sharing regime to be successful, it is vital that education 
campaigns be strongly pushed and publicized by the proper 
authorities, so as to ensure that the requisite knowledge is 
reaching donors of all ages and backgrounds. In order to 
see a greater number of donors coming forward, donors 
need to know that this is an option.158 It is likely also 
helpful for them to understand why doing so is important.  
This paper’s second recommendation is that 
Ontario should create a voluntary, provincial gamete donor 
registry. This registry could maintain and manage 
information disclosure between donors and DCIs. The type 
of information housed in this registry could include 
information gathered from fertility clinics, such as donor-
DCI pairings (i.e., records detailing which donor’s gametes 
were used to conceive the DCI in question) and non-
identifying donor information that could be legally 
disclosed to the DCI without the donor’s consent (for 
example, blood type, height, medical history, etc.). The 
registry could also include information that is voluntarily 
provided by donors themselves, such as up-to-date contact 
information, newly acquired medical diagnoses, names, 
photographs, or letters. Similar to what was originally 
envisioned for AHRC, this provincial registry could 
oversee and manage the disclosure of this information. It 
could also process applications from DCIs who wish to 
ensure that they are not biologically related to potential 
partners. Finally, this registry could provide free 
counselling services and facilitate contact between DCIs, 
 
158  See VARTA, Consultation with Donors, supra note 68 at 6 (donors 
suggested using publicity campaigns to raise awareness, believing this 
would help persuade donors to join the Voluntary Register). 
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donors, donor siblings, and/or legal parents, where such 
contact is mutually desired.  
Although this paper has been somewhat critical of 
Victoria’s decision to retrospectively remove donor 
anonymity, many useful lessons can be gleaned from other 
aspects of Victoria’s gamete donation system. Some 
commendable features include Victoria’s implementation 
of a centralized agency (i.e., VARTA), its standardization 
of data collection, its public outreach, and its provision of 
free counselling services. These beneficial features could 
be incorporated into a voluntary registry in Ontario. Such 
a model would represent a significant improvement over 
the current Donor Sibling Registry, which is decentralized, 
unregulated, under-funded, poorly publicized, and siloed 
away from relevant provincial authorities and fertility 
treatment providers. 
While these recommendations attempt to create a 
positive legal environment for gamete donors and DCIs 
alike, there are some important caveats that come with this 
paper’s proposed scheme. First, these proposed 
recommendations are only effective if DCIs are actually 
aware that they are donor conceived. Unfortunately, ample 
evidence suggests that many DCIs have not been informed 
of their conceptual origins.159 Second, because the 
proposed recommendations are premised on voluntary 
information sharing, it is unlikely that all donors will be 
willing to participate. Sadly, this means that some DCIs 
will continue to struggle with the barriers that are being 
encountered under the current status quo. Third, it has been 
argued that a nation-wide registry would be more effective 
 
159  See Inquiry into Access, supra note 92 at 99. 
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than a provincial registry, as the former model promotes 
increased uniformity and accessibility.160 However, there 
has been a considerable lack of appetite for any pan-
Canadian or inter-provincial movement,161 and due to the 
constitutional barriers surrounding the federal 
government’s involvement in this area, it is questionable 
whether a national system could successfully be 
implemented. The proposed solution is therefore self-
admittedly flawed. However, it is unrealistic to expect a 
perfect solution to such a complicated and multifaceted 
problem. In accordance with relational ethics, these 
recommendations represent a bona fide attempt to 
harmonize the complex and interconnected interests of the 
parties involved.  
CONCLUSION 
In light of Victoria’s recent decision to retrospectively 
remove gamete donor anonymity, this paper compared 
Victoria’s mandatory disclosure regime to Ontario’s 
current system, in order to examine whether it would be 
prudent for Ontario to enact similar, retrospective 
legislation. Ultimately, this paper concluded that Ontario 
should not take a similar course of action. To support its 
thesis, this paper first discussed the inherent issues 
surrounding retrospective legislation. Retrospective 
amendments undermine the rule of law and are largely 
unfair to the individuals who relied on the old legislation 
in their decision-making. Certain retrospective enactments 
can therefore lead to injustice as well as distrust in law and 
the government at large. Due to these serious problems, 
 
160  See Gruben & Cameron, supra note 5 at 679. 
161  See Gruben & Cameron, supra note 5 at 671–72. 
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retrospective laws should only be created if they are 
founded on solid ethical and evidence-based grounds.  
 This paper then explored the jurisdictions’ different 
approaches to overseeing gamete donation as well as the 
evidence used to support Victoria’s retrospective 
amendments. Ultimately, this paper concluded that 
Victoria’s new policy did not reflect the evidence that was 
collected from key stakeholders. While VARTA’s report 
initially led to the conclusion that identifying information 
should only be released with the donors’ consent, a newly 
elected government legislated the opposite in order to 
fulfill an election promise. Moreover, Victoria employed 
ill-suited reasoning when developing its existing policy 
framework. Rather than using a relational approach, 
Victoria weighed the harms to DCIs against the harms to 
donors. As a result, it created a legislative scheme that was 
oppositional in nature and therefore unconducive to 
supporting healthy relationships. 
 Through undertaking a relational approach, this 
paper made two recommendations for Ontario to 
ameliorate its current regime, in lieu of following 
Victoria’s retrospective tactic. First, this paper suggested 
that Ontario should increase its efforts to educate the public 
on the importance of information disclosure in gamete 
donation. Second, it recommended that an official, 
provincial donor registry be created in order to help 
facilitate DCIs’ access to important information. While 
these suggestions do not offer a perfect solution, they 
represent a bona fide attempt to harmonize the complex 
interests of the parties at hand. These recommendations 
facilitate DCIs’ access to important information while 
simultaneously appreciating donors’ privacy interests. The 
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resulting system will hopefully promote collaboration, 
rather than opposition; education, rather than imposition; 
and harmony, rather than hierarchy. 
